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INTRODUCTION
On October 28, 2014, in a closed session during the Children and
International Criminal Justice Conference at the University of Georgia
School of Law, several experts discussed the implementation of various
regulatory mechanisms that may be utilized by the International Criminal
Court (ICC) when prosecuting crimes against children. The discussion
largely concerned the application of international criminal law in four areas:
(1) determinations of competency regarding children in armed conflict; (2)
crimes preventing access to education; (3) crimes relating to human
trafficking; and (4) crimes preventing access to healthcare. The experts also
focused their discussion around what roles the ICC and the Office of the
Prosecutor (OTP) should play in developing international criminal law.
Additionally, the ICC’s effectiveness as a deterrent against the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community also merited discussion
from the experts. Each topic is discussed separately below.
CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT: COMPETENCY DETERMINATIONS
The ICC has applied international law to the prosecution of crimes
relating to children in armed conflict. For example, Thomas Lubanga was
convicted of the war crime of conscripting and enlisting child soldiers under
the age of fifteen.1 However, complexities inherent in the prosecution of
individuals charged with recruiting child soldiers highlight several
challenges facing the ICC. For example, child soldiers are perhaps
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appropriately regarded as both victims of war crimes—i.e., those
involuntarily recruited and abducted into military service—and as active
participants accused of murder and various other offenses, such as sexual
assault. The OTP currently considers any individual above the age of
eighteen an adult eligible for prosecution. However, multiple panel experts
expressed the need to consider a broader array of criteria to determine a
defendant’s competency to stand trial as an adult. Other experts argued that
practical realities of prosecuting crimes related to child soldiering require the
application of bright-line rules. As a result, discussion was largely focused
on the nature of the criteria used to determine competency, the potential use
of prior recruitment as a mitigating factor in sentencing, and the use of
prosecutorial discretion to broaden the scope of international criminal law in
this context.
Criteria
As mentioned above, both the ICC and the OTP are generally inclined to
consider individuals above the age of eighteen as adults eligible for
prosecution, though there are inherent difficulties that accompany the use of
this bright-line rule. First, in the absence of state-certified records, there is
no accurate scientific or medical method for determining a person’s age.
Some organizations have attempted to use a “cross-checking” method where
both the individual and members of the community are interviewed in an
attempt to make age determinations. Unfortunately, this method can be
thwarted: once the party recruiting child soldiers is aware an investigation is
in progress, it is easy to hide—or kill—any person who might speak contrary
to their wishes.
Second, this arguably arbitrary line does not take into account many
individuals that may be both victims and perpetrators of war crimes. For
example, a twenty-year-old soldier guilty of enlisting children under the age
of fifteen may himself also have been conscripted at such an age. In such a
situation, some argue that child development must be taken into account as
these individuals may have missed key developmental milestones essential to
the adult maturation process. Rather than utilize these bright-line rules,
panel experts suggest establishing international guidelines that incorporate
criteria from relevant literature and experts on child-development to
determine competency.
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Age as a Mitigating Factor
Utilizing guidelines informed by sociological research regarding stages of
child development may ultimately be a fruitless endeavor. Such an inquiry
may be too directed toward utilizing a case-by-case analysis of a given
individual’s capability to possess the requisite mens rea for the alleged
crime. Further, childhood is often a culturally defined concept; many
cultures utilize differing definitions or simply do not recognize “childhood”
as a stage of development at all. Such factors may render the use of
guidelines unsustainable at the international level.
Moreover, any recognition of kidnapping or prior recruitment as a
defense cannot overlook the gravity of the crimes a defendant allegedly
perpetrated as an adult. Regardless of questions of development and
competency, those who perpetrate these crimes seem to be aware of the
criminal element implicit in their actions. Why else would child recruiters
go to such lengths to hide individuals that could potentially incriminate
them? Use of a bright-line rule establishing a minimum age of culpability
seems to combat the potential for a vacuum of accountability. Considering
these factors, such criteria are arguably best utilized at the sentencing stage.
Rather than inoculating a defendant from prosecution, recruitment as a child
and its effects on an individual’s level of maturity and development can be
used as a mitigating factor when sentencing a convicted perpetrator.
Prosecutorial Discretion
ICC prosecutions ostensibly serve two key functions: justice and
deterrence. The ICC’s previous prosecutions and investigations arguably
have substantial deterrence value with respect to child soldiering; labeling a
child-recruiter as a war criminal and disseminating this information both
domestically and internationally has had far-reaching effects. However,
urging the ICC to pursue further prosecutions of child-recruiters may result
in diminishing returns. The ICC has limited resources, and therefore only
realistically possesses the means to prosecute the most reprehensible and
visibly culpable criminal actors. In this context, the ICC’s pursuit of “big
fish” on the international level provides a model that domestic courts may
utilize in pursuing justice for “smaller fish,” such as child-recruiters in lower
levels of a given command structure.
The ICC’s time may be better spent pursuing the activities of individuals
committing crimes against children in other contexts. Courts do not typically
view adulthood in terms of competency and developmental maturity.
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Moreover, judges are often reticent to expand or develop the law in such a
sweeping and arguably fundamental manner. While it is acknowledged that
the duty of any prosecutor is to push the court to further expand the law,
prosecutorial discretion must be exercised to gain convictions where they are
more readily attainable. Viewed in this context, discussion of international
norms and guidelines is perhaps better left to the domestic courts or the
United Nations General Assembly.
CRIMES AGAINST ACCESS TO EDUCATION
Attacks against schools and educational facilities are generally
acknowledged as matters of grave concern to the international community.
Such attacks not only hinder a child’s rightful access to education, but also
increase the risk of abduction and recruitment into child soldiering and
sexual slavery. However, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court paints criminal attacks directed against educational facilities with a
broad brush and exempts attacks directed against educational facilities
utilized for “military objectives.”2 This wrinkle complicates any attempt to
further develop attacks against education as a legal concept, as any militarily
occupied facility may be considered a legitimate target and therefore legally
susceptible to attack. Further complicating the issue is the manner in which
such potential crimes occur. Attacks against educational facilities are often
conducted in conjunction with other crimes. The experts agreed that the ICC
must develop and establish criteria for the prosecution of such crimes, raise
awareness on the topic, and exercise prosecutorial discretion to enhance the
development of international criminal law in this area.
Criteria
Article 8 of the Rome Statute defines a “war crime” in a variety of
contexts. Article 8(b) articulates several specific activities that are
considered “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in
international armed conflict, within the established framework of
international law,” and includes acts that are “intentionally direct[ed] against
buildings dedicated to religion, education . . . provided they are not military
objectives.”3 While the ICC has recently decided to open an investigation
into an attack on an educational facility, international criminal law relating to
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
Id. art. 8(b)(ix) (emphasis added).
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attacks against education and educational facilities is largely undeveloped.
As a result, criteria must be developed to pursue the prosecution of these
crimes at the international level. Specifically, such criteria must focus on the
exception for educational facilities used for military objectives. Other
criteria must be developed to distinguish when schools may be treated as
either legitimate or illegitimate military targets.
Raising Awareness
As noted above, state military forces are often installed in and around
educational facilities under the mandate of “protecting schools and
education.” However, this provides cover for those accused of attacking the
facility to justify the attack based on its use as a military facility. Use of this
narrative complicates public perception of these crimes. Therefore, efforts
must be made to raise international awareness of these attacks. One
suggested method emphasizes the use of well-crafted narratives throughout
the prosecution of an undeniably guilty and well-known individual. Much in
the same way that Lubanga’s prosecution exposed and raised general
awareness of crimes associated with child soldiering, prosecution of an
undeniably guilty person or persons accused of destroying a school could
employ narratives exposing the multitude of crimes associated with an attack
against education, even if the attack is not an independent ground for
conviction.
Prosecutorial Discretion
Because international criminal law relating to crimes against education is
sparse, the ICC is limited in its ability to effectively develop law within this
area. Approaching the topic in terms of disparate impact theory—such as
establishing a pattern or practice of failure to respect education in general—
is likely to fall on deaf ears. As mentioned above, courts are unlikely to be
eager to develop the law in this manner. Rather, the ICC and OTP should
focus their efforts on those instances where rock-solid evidence exists that an
individual or individuals directly attacked educational facilities. Such a
method could not only pave the way for broader convictions in the future,
but also provide a model for domestic courts to utilize in the future
prosecution of such crimes. Moreover, a clear conviction of an individual
responsible for a direct attack against a school or educational facility would
reaffirm the legal concept within the framework of international
humanitarian law and reinforce the efforts of the Office of the Special
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Rapporteur for Children in Armed Conflict’s goal of stigmatizing grave
violations.
HUMAN TRAFFICKING
The discussion also focused on human trafficking, another grave violation
of human rights. Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute defines enslavement as a
crime against humanity. Article 7(2)(c) defines enslavement as, “the
exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a
person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in
persons, in particular women and children.”4 Prosecutable human trafficking
occurs “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population.”5 While the Rome Statute
designates human trafficking as a “crime against humanity,” and the
statutory emphasis placed on women and children imply preference in
prosecution, many obstacles exist to the successful prosecution of this crime.
Criteria
Unfortunately for the sake of the ICC’s jurisdiction, most human
trafficking incidents are not systematic. It has proven difficult to find a case
where trafficking meets the legal definition of the Rome Statute. However,
multiple experts suggested that if the trafficking involves children, it may be
less difficult to prosecute as a broader coercion element would not have to be
proven. To prosecute successfully, the ICC needs to evaluate the act, means,
and purpose, and look specifically towards whether or not the perpetrator
used these child victims for exploitation.
Prosecutorial Discretion
When prosecuting a human trafficking case, the elements of a typical
trafficking case can be used. The systematic element would still need to be
present, though, and not just in small numbers. As with access to education,
the strongest cases for prosecution should be chosen—the so-called “big
fish.” The OTP should be searching for persons who are specifically
trafficking children for the purposes of sex and forced slavery to support a
war effort.
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CRIMES AGAINST HEALTHCARE
Another major concern for the ICC and the international community are
attacks on hospitals and healthcare. Multiple experts on the panel expressed
concern over recent examples of women and children in Syria being denied
access to healthcare. The discussion group generally agreed that there was a
pressing need to broadly stigmatize the lack of respect for healthcare.
However, differing opinions were offered as to what would be a sufficiently
severe punishment for stigmatization to be an effective deterrent.
Criteria
Article 8 of the Rome Statute condemns physical attacks on hospitals and,
by extension, healthcare. Article 8(2)(b)(ix) states that intentionally
directing attacks against buildings dedicated as hospitals and places where
the sick and wounded are collected is a serious violation of the laws and
customs applicable to international armed conflict and law.6 However,
indictments for impeding healthcare may prove to be more difficult than
indictments for intentionally targeting hospitals.
Condemnations on a Broader Scale
While some experts believe that any attack on healthcare should be
condemned, whether it be denial of healthcare access or the political use of
hospitals, others believe that the OTP should be looking for and prosecuting
their strongest case. It was suggested that the “pile of rubble” test, where a
school is physically demolished or attacked, should be the deciding factor for
the OTP’s decision to prosecute. On the opposite end of the spectrum, other
experts believed that the OTP should take a stronger stance against attacks
on healthcare and that something less overt—such as intimidation of
healthcare professionals and patients, hospital occupation, and blocking
humanitarian aid—should be prosecuted alongside more heinous crimes.
These experts stated that it is necessary to punish those involved in these less
overt attacks on healthcare for the purpose of broadly stigmatizing and
condemning attacks on healthcare and healthcare facilities. There was a lack
of consensus on how these more isolated acts could be prosecuted, however,
as ICC judges have not aggressively interpreted the law.
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Prosecutorial Discretion
As mentioned above, the ICC’s judges have been conservative with their
interpretation of the law. The judges tend to apply the law without seeking
to expand its reach. Trying to push for something more progressive has
proven to be difficult. However, the ICC’s conservatism in its formative
stages may be necessary in order to allow for the development of its structure
and administration. The ICC judges may become more open to what some
might call judicial activism in the future as the institution becomes more
developed and established. While this may be frustrating for those who want
to see the ICC advance farther in its condemnation of many aspects of
different crimes, it is important that the OTP continues to win its cases.
Successful prosecution and convictions will serve to increase the
stigmatization of the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community and enhance corresponding dialogue around the world.
THE ICC AS A DETERRENT
As reiterated above, the two main tenants of the ICC are accountability
and deterrence. For the latter, the ICC is able to utilize the title of “war
criminal” as a valuable deterrent mechanism. While there are limits to
deterrence in criminal law, the experts’ discussion focused on maximizing
the effect of deterrence by focusing the ICC’s prosecutorial strategy on
realistic, high-profile, and achievable cases.
Maximizing Deterrence
The use of “war criminal” as a label has value and can be used as a
deterrent if cases are successfully prosecuted. The risk of a criminal
indictment and conviction is a powerful deterrent. One expert favorably
cited the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for
conducting investigations and prosecutions of sexual violence and rape even
though it was not written into the applicable statutes and argued that the ICC
should create new law for effective deterrence in a similar fashion. Others
argued, however, that the ICC should consider handling cases in a manner
similar to Canada’s Supreme Court by utilizing a more compromising and
less precarious approach to achieve the desired results. Like the Canadian
Supreme Court, the ICC should be working through the designed system that
is already in place to obtain convictions instead of attempting to push
aggressive prosecutions. In this view, the ICC is part of a system. When a
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case is successfully prosecuted, it creates a universe of partners. Many
perpetrators will be uncomfortable with their crimes or crimes similar to
theirs being placed in the spotlight. If would-be war criminals see a network
being established as the result of successful prosecutions, the goal of
effective deterrence can realistically be achieved.
CONCLUSION
The ICC was not intended to cover every possible crime against
humanity. The Rome Statute created a system, not a court. The purpose of
the OTP is to find and prosecute the most responsible parties to set an
example for the international community going forward. The rest of the ICC
system depends on the national systems and domestic courts filling in the
prosecutorial gaps that remain. The ICC intends for the complementary
national systems to try and convict low to mid-level perpetrators. Here,
domestic enforcement arms, NGOs, and civil society are vital for the purpose
of assisting these national systems in the prosecution of lower level—but
equally important—cases.
In addition to the domestic courts functioning within the system, it is also
the responsibility of the OTP to push the ICC judges towards more
convictions and apportioning appropriate punishments. While not always
effective, there have been instances where the OTP was successful in
changing the structure of the courts. For example, in the ongoing ICC
investigation in Kenya there is no formal power for the ICC to compel
witnesses to appear. But the OTP pushed the judges to compel nine
witnesses, arguing that it was unfair that the domestic courts had the power
to compel but the ICC did not. This line of argument was successful and
four witnesses have since testified.
The ICC will not and was not intended to be the only forum for punishing
international crime. It is more important that the ICC brings these
convictions to light, thus providing the courage and guidance for national
and domestic courts to prosecute the remaining perpetrators. If the ICC
system and national systems function together as intended, there will
ultimately be a reduction in crimes of international concern.

